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Dissertation Title: Essays on the Design of Public Policies

References:

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Fields of Concentration:

Public Economics
Industrial Organization
Labor Economics
Econometrics

Desired Teaching:

Public Economics
Industrial Organization
Labor Economics
Econometrics

Graduate Studies:

University of Gothenburg, 2014 to present
PhD Economics
Supervisors: Prof. Mikael Lindahl, Prof. Aico van Vuuren

Stanford University, 2017-2018
Visiting Researcher at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Host: Prof. Mark Duggan

University of Oxford, 2016
Visiting DPhil Student at Department of Economics
Host: Prof. Simon Quinn

Undergraduate Studies:

University of Warwick (joint with Lund University), 2012 – 2014
MSc Economic Development and Growth
Kharkiv National University of Economics, 2007 – 2012
BSc, MSc Mathematical Economics

Working Papers:

“Private Information and Design of Unemployment Insurance” [job market paper]
“Behavioral Responses and Design of Bequest Taxation”, with Simon Schürz

Works in Progress:

“Determinants of University Competition and Student Demand in Higher Education: Evidence from Australia”, with Natalie Bachas
“Housing Markets, Individual Preferences and Spatial Equilibria”
“Wealth vs. Bequest Taxation: Evidence from Sweden”

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

Siamon Stiftelsen Travel Grant, 2018
Donationsnämnden Travel Grant, 2018
Hedelliusstendium Travel Grant, 2016
Nordic Tax Council Research Grant, 2016
Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Travel Grant, 2016
Adlerbertska Stipendiestiftelsen Travel Grants, 2016
Paul och Marie Berghaus donationsfond Travel Grant, 2015, 2016

Research Experience:

International Labour Organization, Consultant, 2017
International Labour Organization, Consultant, 2016

Teaching Experience:

Lecturer and Teaching Assistant, Advanced Industrial Organization (Graduate level), 2016 - 2018
Teaching Assistant, Basic Econometrics (Undergraduate level), 2018
Thesis Advisor, (1 graduate and 6 undergraduate students), 2017 - 2018
Lecturer and Teaching Assistant, Research Methods (Graduate level), 2015

Presentations and Summer Schools:

Econometric Society Winter Meeting, 2018
Public Economics seminar, Stanford University, 2018
Industrial Organization seminar, Stanford University, 2018
Price Theory Camp, University of Chicago, 2017
Summer Schools on Socioeconomic Inequality (HCEO), University of Chicago, 2016
Health Economics Conference, University of Gothenburg (discussant), 2013

Technical Skills:

Programming Languages: Python, R, Julia, Java, C++, MATLAB
Data Analytics Tools: Stata, SQL, Pandas, Numpy, Sklearn, Keras, TensorFlow, Tableau, Jupyter, Hive, Spark, Presto, ArcGIS
Other Software & Tools: LaTeX, Git

Languages:

English (fluent), Russian (native), Ukrainian (native), Swedish (proficient)

Dissertation Abstract

Government policies intervene in many areas of economic and social environment. Most often the aim is to address market failures that hinder efficiency or undesirable socioeconomic outcomes. However, it is important to ensure that those policies achieve the desired outcomes without causing distortions themselves. My dissertation focuses on studying the design and regulations in government policies and markets with a view to these trade-offs.

In Chapter One, **Private Information and Design of Unemployment Insurance** (job market paper), I use the institutional features of the Swedish voluntary unemployment insurance (UI) system to study the optimal design and regulation of UI. The Swedish system differs from widely adopted mandatory UI that prevents welfare losses from the selection into insurance. However, mandates might generate welfare losses due to fully restricted individual choice that does not allow selection on preferences. With detailed administrative data, I estimate a structural model of insurance choice that captures heterogeneity in preferences and private information about future unemployment risks. The model is used to study several alternative designs of the UI program. The results suggest that imposing a mandate in UI would lead to considerable welfare losses associated with large heterogeneity of preferences for insurance. In contrast, voluntary contracts that adequately restrict relevant dimensions of selection would generate welfare gains. I find that contracts with fixed length and predetermined enrollment timing dominate all other considered options and generate considerable consumer surplus gains from 58% to 95% on average depending on the contract duration.

In Chapter Two, **Behavioral Responses and Design of Bequest Taxation** (with Simon Schürz), we study optimal design of an intergenerational wealth tax, commonly represented by inheritance or estate taxation. We leverage a unique and appropriate setup of Swedish inheritance taxation and rich administrative data on bequests. To understand the individual behavior under various tax schemes, we estimate a comprehensive structural model of wealth accumulation and bequest decisions in old age. We find that comparable inheritance and estate tax result in similar distortions to wealth accumulation and bequest distributions. By limiting strategic avoidance through adjustments in bequest distributions, estate taxation outperforms inheritance taxes in terms of tax revenues. Our model enables policymakers to design a bequest tax that balances distortions, progressiveness, tax revenue and tax incidence according to their social welfare functions.

In Chapter Three, **Determinants of University Competition and Student Demand in Higher Education: Evidence from Australia** (with Natalie Bachas), we exploit detailed administrative data from an Australian college admission center and exogenous variation in tuitions fees. Firstly, we show that students' choices are affected by price changes. Furthermore, we present evidence that universities use admission thresholds to compete for a number and quality of admitted students. We estimate a model of college demand and university competition to study the determinants of student demand, university competition and consequences of government interventions in college markets. The findings suggest that price regulations result in different outcomes compared to direct admission regulations. Because of the strategic behavior of universities, pricing policies might lead to segregation by the quality of students or by socioeconomic status. Both effects might be viewed as undesirable consequences of government interventions, which fundamentally depend on a joint distribution of student characteristics and distributional preferences.